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With the emergence of the Great Recession unemployment insurance (UI) is once again at
the heart of the policy debate. In this paper, we focus on the recent theoretical and empirical
evidence on the labor market e↵ects of UI design. We provide an overview of the design
of UI in various countries and we discuss policy issues related to the structure of the UI
system, including the pros and cons of a UI system in which the generosity of UI benefits
is varying over the business cycle. Finally, we identify potential areas of future research on
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1 Introduction
When workers lose their job for reasons outside their control they may be eligible for unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) benefits. Whether they are in fact eligible and how generous these benefits
are depends on the design of the UI system. The main purpose of UI design is to provide the
best balance between consumption smoothing and limiting adverse e↵ects of incentives to work.
Changes in the UI design happen quite frequently as response to changing economic conditions
or on the basis of dissatisfaction about the previous design. With the emergence of the Great
Recession, the labor market e↵ects of UI are once again in the heart of the political debate
(OECD, 2010). In the discussion both short-term and long-term perspectives of UI systems are
important. The short-term perspective is related to the role of UI benefits in funding short-
time work arrangements to dampen the e↵ects of the Great Recession, while the long-term
perspective is related to the role of UI benefits over the economic cycle. As usual, the level and
especially the maximum duration of unemployment benefits are also elements in this discussion.
In the past decade new theoretical and empirical studies have been published and the ques-
tion is to what extent does this recent literature provides novel insights into the optimal design
of UI. We provide an overview of recent theoretical and empirical evidence on incentives in-
fluencing the behavior of employed workers and UI recipients and discuss its implications for
UI design.1 In our presentation and discussion we focus on the two main characteristics of
a UI system, the level and maximum duration of benefits, but we also discuss eligibility and
entitlement conditions. We also provide a discussion of a UI system in which level and duration
of benefits are varying over the business cycle. By focusing on the labor market e↵ects of UI
design we do not address the interactions between UI and other labor market institutions.2
The set-up of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we give an overview of theoretical and
empirical studies on incentives related to unemployment insurance. Section 3 presents some
stylized facts of labor markets in relation to unemployment and a brief description of the UI
system in various countries. In section 4 we present relevant policy issues for the design of
the UI systems derived from the literature overview in relation to the main characteristics of
current systems. In the last section we provide concluding remarks on the design of the UI and
we identify areas for future research.
2 Incentives related to Unemployment Insurance
UI provides unemployed workers with benefits in order to smooth consumption. However, at
the same time UI may induce moral hazard. With UI an unemployed worker may search less
intensively for a new job than she would otherwise do if no benefit was provided. The tension
between insurance and incentives is at the heart of UI design.
Providing private unemployment insurance is problematic for various reasons. The first
2
problem concerns asymmetric information. The worker has more information about her unem-
ployment risk than the insurer. If an insurance company would establish the insurance premium
on the basis of the average unemployment risk, the insurance will not be attractive for workers
with a low unemployment risk. For a given insurance premium unemployment insurance is
especially attractive for workers with a high unemployment risk. This causes adverse selection
of ‘bad’ risks; the insurance company makes losses or has to increase the insurance premium.
However, if unemployment insurance becomes more expensive it is even more unattractive for
low risk workers. The obvious solution to this problem is that insurance companies select work-
ers and do not allow high risks to enter or the company di↵erentiates insurance premiums only
o↵ering high premiums to high risk individuals. Both solutions are often unacceptable from a
societal point of view. While it mimics market insurance, collective unemployment insurance
deviates from actuarial principles by charging premiums that do not reflect individual risks.
Furthermore, unemployment risks are correlated and di cult to predict. In a recession many
workers become unemployed at the same time. If recessions would be predictable they could be
accounted for when establishing the UI premiums. However, the unpredictability of correlated
events requires adjustments of UI premiums to avoid UI funds going bankrupt. Only the state
has the power to enforce these adjustments. For all these reasons unemployment insurance is
usually a mandatory and collective arrangement.
Numerous studies have analyzed various aspects of the functioning of the unemployment
insurance system. Their findings show that thanks to its economy-wide risk-pooling, unemploy-
ment insurance enables a high degree of consumption smoothing (Gruber, 1997; Browning and
Crossley, 2001), performs well under idiosyncratic, sectoral, and regional shocks, and acts as
an automatic macroeconomic stabilizer.3 But studies also find that unemployment insurance
creates reemployment disincentives by prolonging unemployment duration and contributing to
higher equilibrium unemployment. However, the magnitude of disincentive e↵ects is not a
firmly established parameter, and the literature is inconclusive and rather thin on important
aspects. To stimulate workers to search for a job several incentive mechanisms are introduced.
These mechanisms can be grouped under three headings: sequencing of benefits, monitoring
and benefit sanctions, and workfare (see also Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006a and 2006b).
We focus on the incentive mechanisms which influence the outflow from the UI system such
as level and duration of unemployment, and influence the inflow into unemployment such as
eligibility criteria, while we ignore issues such as monitoring and benefit sanctions and active
labor market policies.4
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2.1 Theory
2.1.1 Unemployment outflow
Partial Equilibrium Model
The partial equilibrium search model has been central in studying the e↵ect of unemployment
benefits on the exit rate from unemployment.5 Unemployed workers choose a reservation wage
which balances the costs and benefits of continued search and thus determines whether they
accept or reject received o↵ers. An increase in the benefit level leads to an increase in the
reservation wage, which lowers the unemployment exit rate and increases the duration of unem-
ployment. This behavioral response to more generous benefits has been interpreted as a moral
hazard e↵ect. Allowing for search e↵ort as an additional choice for the unemployed job-seeker
does not alter the main e↵ect of benefit receipt. An increase of the benefit level not only in-
creases the reservation wage but it also leads to a lower search e↵ort, both of which a↵ects the
job-finding rate negatively.
Allowing for non-stationarity, in which the benefit level changes over the unemployment spell
and benefit duration is limited, the main theoretical prediction is an increasing job finding rate
over the spell of insured unemployment (see Mortensen, 1977; Van den Berg, 1990). When the UI
system defines a declining profile of benefit payments or a benefit termination the instantaneous
income declines over time leading to a reduction in the value of unemployment. The decline in
the value of unemployment over the course of the unemployment spell leads to a drop in the
reservation wage, which results in a higher exit rate close to benefit exhaustion.
In most UI systems, benefit entitlement depends on previous employment experience, which
is in contrast to the assumption of the basic model that all unemployed receive benefits. Typ-
ically, new entrants in the labor market and long-term unemployed are not entitled to receive
unemployment insurance. Finding a job for this type of unemployed means also becoming en-
titled to unemployment insurance in case they lose their job in the future. This entitlement
e↵ect increases the incentive to accept jobs for UI recipients close to benefit exhaustion and
for those who are not entitled to unemployment benefits. The change in the behavior of job
seekers over the spell of unemployment and the entitlement e↵ect implies that individuals with
di↵erent lengths of benefit entitlement would behave di↵erently.
For a given length of unemployment and for a given level of benefits, an increase in the
potential benefit duration will lead to a higher reservation wage, and consequently to a rise
in the average duration of unemployment. The disincentive e↵ect at the beginning of the
unemployment spell is expected to be small. The largest e↵ect of an increase in benefit duration
is expected for unemployment durations close to the benefit expiration period because the
reservation wage at that time will be significantly higher compared to the situation without a
benefit extension, in which the reservation wage is at its lowest level.
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An increase in the benefit level will also a↵ect unemployed workers di↵erently depending
on their elapsed unemployment duration. Contrary to an extension of the benefit duration, an
increase in the replacement rate has its largest e↵ect at the start of the unemployment spell.
For a recent unemployed worker, an increase in the benefit level will lower the exit rate from
unemployment as a result of a higher value of unemployment. The job seeker will demand a
higher wage before accepting a job o↵er. For an unemployed close to benefit exhaustion, a
higher benefit level will lead to a higher exit rate due to the entitlement e↵ect.
Based on this simple version of the job search model, the overall e↵ect of an increase in
the generosity of benefits on the average duration of unemployment depends on the balance
of two opposing e↵ects. First, a higher amount of benefits and a longer benefit duration will
lower the exit rate from unemployment. Second, for the non-eligible and for those close to ben-
efit exhaustion, more generous benefits will create an incentive to find a job faster due to the
entitlement e↵ect. However, since the entitlement e↵ect is second-order it is likely that the dis-
incentive e↵ect dominates so an increase in benefit generosity will lead to longer unemployment
durations.
Liquidity Constraints
The shape of the e↵ect of benefit level and potential benefit duration depends on the extent to
which individuals are liquidity constrained. In the presence of complete credit and insurance
markets, where consumption can be smoothed perfectly, an increase of UI benefits operates only
through moral hazard and there will be no reason for the reservation wage to vary over the course
of the unemployment spell. The moral hazard interpretation of longer unemployment duration
in the presence of more generous UI ignores the role of liquidity constraints. Chetty (2008)
suggests that the overall e↵ect of a change in benefits on the search e↵ort can be decomposed
to a moral hazard e↵ect and a liquidity e↵ect. When individuals cannot smooth consumption
perfectly an increase of UI benefits allows the unemployed to search longer without the pressure
to find a new job quickly, which leads to longer unemployment duration. Shimer and Werning
(2007) also challenge the moral hazard interpretation of individual behavior by arguing that
the after-tax reservation wage measures the well-being of unemployed workers. Therefore, if
increases of UI benefits raise the average after-tax reservation wage this would increase welfare.6
Equilibrium Search Model
The basic search model delivers predictions of the e↵ect of UI on unemployment duration and on
individual wages through its e↵ect on the reservation wage and search e↵ort. The equilibrium
search model instead models both workers and firms decisions and considers equilibrium wages,
which are derived endogenously (see Pissarides, 2000). In the original formulation of the model
wages are determined through Nash wage bargaining, which is the mechanism that shares the
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rents created due to frictions between workers and firms. For both firms and workers the
rents are the di↵erence between what they could obtain through forming a match and the best
outside opportunity. The sum of the rents creates the surplus to be shared. In this framework,
an increase of unemployment benefits increases the value of unemployment for the job-seeker,
which leads to an increase in their wage in the bargaining process. Since a higher wage lowers
firms’ expected profits, to restore equilibrium firms lower the average cost of vacancies by
reducing the number of vacancies, which lowers labor market tightness, the ratio of the number
of vacancies and the number of unemployed. An increase in benefits and the corresponding
drop in labor market tightness leads to an increase in the unemployment rate.
The equilibrium search model with Nash bargaining has been challenged recently. Shimer
(2005) shows that the standard search and matching model cannot explain the cyclical behavior
of unemployment and vacancies, which are both highly variable and strongly negatively cor-
related in U.S. data. In addition, the model cannot explain the strong procyclicality of the
job-finding rate. The main explanation for the failure of the model to fit the data is that wages
are determined by Nash bargaining, which implies that wages respond flexibly to productivity
shocks that hit the economy. A positive productivity shock, for example, increases job creation
by firms opening up more vacancies, which leads to an increased job-finding rate and a lower
unemployment rate. The increase in hiring, however, lowers unemployment duration raising
workers’ threat point in wage bargaining, which leads to a higher wage. This wage flexibility
lowers employer’s gain from the productivity shock eliminating the incentive for vacancy cre-
ation. As a result, fluctuations in labor productivity have little impact on the unemployment,
vacancy, and job-finding rates.
This critique on the ability of the equilibrium search model to explain the business cyclicality
of its key components (unemployment and vacancies) has led to suggestions of alternative wage
determination mechanisms that generate more rigid wages. Hall (2005) o↵ers an alternative in
which real wages are determined by a social norm that does not change over the business cycle.
Shimer (2005) suggests that countercyclical movements in workers’ bargaining power could also
allow for amplification of shocks in the economy.7
2.1.2 Unemployment inflow
Unemployment benefits may also a↵ect the unemployment rate via a higher inflow from employ-
ment. There are di↵erent ways this might occur. First, in the equilibrium search model with
an endogenous job destruction rate (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) more generous unem-
ployment benefits exert an upward pressure on wages, which makes jobs become unprofitable
more quickly and be destroyed.
The benefit system may also a↵ect the inflow into unemployment by changing the participa-
tion decisions of inactive individuals. Rather than being employed or unemployed, individuals
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may decide not to participate at all in the labor market. When unemployment benefits are paid
only to active job-seekers, that is, inactive people do not receive the benefit, an increase in the
generosity of benefits might increase aggregate labor force participation. The intuition is that
the entitlement to higher income while seeking jobs induces more people to be engaged in active
job search. Thus unemployment benefits may actually increase participation.
Finally, another way in which more generous benefits might a↵ect the inflow into unemploy-
ment is by inducing individuals to quit more easily or induce a separation and claim unemploy-
ment benefits. Moral hazard may be problematic not only for unemployed workers but also for
employed workers if it reduces their e↵ort and thus increases the probability that they will be
fired (Karni, 1999).8
2.1.3 Post-unemployment outcomes
Unemployment insurance may not only create disincentives in job search but may also a↵ect
post-unemployment outcomes. There are di↵erent potential mechanisms and relevant outcomes.
First, more generous benefits will have a positive e↵ect on the re-employment wages. The
intuition is that with higher benefits unemployed workers become more demanding in terms of
the wages they are willing to accept. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the first to consider
this e↵ect.
Second, in a labor market with search frictions, benefits perceived as a subsidy for the un-
employed to search for a suitable job tend to reduce job mismatch. When benefits are high,
unemployed workers become more selective, and only accept jobs which are less likely to dis-
solve, and there is an increase in worker productivity growth (Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999).
This leads to a trade-o↵ between unemployment and mismatch, where more benefits increase
the number of high-quality jobs in the labor market but unemployed workers experience higher
unemployment with longer average duration. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that even mod-
erate UI encourages unemployed workers to apply for high-wage jobs with high unemployment
risk and firms create those higher-quality jobs.
Unemployment benefits, therefore, might have an e↵ect on job match quality through higher
wages and employment stability. We discussed earlier that more generous benefits will increase
the inflow into unemployment due to more firing by firms when a productivity shock reduces
their profitability. To the extent that UI increases the quality of the match between workers
and firms increasing their productivity, that might mitigate the e↵ect of UI on the inflow into
unemployment.
2.1.4 The design of unemployment insurance
If the search e↵ort of unemployed workers could be observed and verified then there would be no
moral hazard problem and the optimal design would entail full insurance with a constant profile
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of benefits over the unemployment spell. In the presence of moral hazard, the design of the UI
system needs to consider the trade-o↵ between consumption smoothing through insurance and
incentives to search for work.
Consumption Smoothing
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), focusing on the consumption smoothing and the disincentive
e↵ect of UI, show that even in the presence of moral hazard optimally designed unemployment
insurance programs can yield positive welfare benefits. The utility gain of a UI through con-
sumption smoothing has been empirically documented by Gruber (1997) who finds that benefit
eligibility reduces the drop in consumption in the event of unemployment by one-third compared
to what the drop would have been in the absence of UI.
Benefit Profile
A UI system with a declining sequence of benefits has been considered optimal in the presence
of moral hazard because it provides stronger incentives to search (Shavell and Weiss, 1979;
Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Pavoni and Violante, 2007). Most OECD countries have a
system with declining sequence of benefits through a two-tiered UI system, in which workers
who lose their jobs are entitled to UI benefits for a limited period after which they receive
Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefits. The two-tiered UI system exploits the entitlement
e↵ect that was discussed above as it provides the incentive to search more actively for those who
are close to benefit exhaustion and for those not-entitled to benefits (Fredriksson and Holmlund,
2006a).
Another mechanism to enhance the incentives to exit unemployment is to combine a declining
sequence of benefits with a wage tax after reemployment, whereby the tax level depends on the
duration of the unemployment spell. An increasing tax profile will encourage job finding by
making prolonged search more expensive. In particular, the wage tax could be negative at the
beginning of the unemployment spell representing a bonus for exiting unemployment quickly
(Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997).
There are a number of theoretical considerations that are important regarding the optimal
design of UI. When wages are determined through union-firm bargaining, a decreasing benefit
schedule leads to wage pressure because it increases the welfare of the short-term unemployed
at the expense of the long-term unemployed. When search e↵ort is a choice of the unemployed
worker, a declining sequence of benefits is needed to encourage job search but the incentive
e↵ect will be weaker due to the wage pressure e↵ect (Cahuc and Lehmann, 2000).
When the choice of e↵ort determines not only the job finding probability through search
e↵ort but also the probability of remaining employed through the choice of work e↵ort, then
the optimal UI system might be non-monotonic. In the beginning of the unemployment spell
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the system should induce a large drop in consumption in order to discourage shirking. This will
a↵ect the unemployment inflow. Benefits should increase initially and then fall throughout the
spell (Wang and Williamson, 1996). The initial increase is similar to the re-employment bonus
of a negative wage tax of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) at the beginning of the unemployment
spell followed by a declining sequence of benefits. Overall, the literature regarding the sequence
of benefits suggests that a declining profile provides better incentives than a flat (or increasing)
profile.
The literature discussed so far on the optimal design of UI has considered models in which the
unemployment agency can a↵ect the consumption patterns of the agents through the sequence of
benefits. This rest in the assumption that the agents cannot save and borrow without constraints
from the market. Recent research has allowed for borrowing and savings, which means that the
employment agency cannot influence the consumption profile of the unemployed worker through
a declining benefit profile (e.g. Chetty, 2008; Pavoni, 2007; Shimer and Werning, 2008). The
optimal policy in this case is a constant benefit level that insures workers against unemployment
risk, while their ability to dissave and borrow allows them to avoid transitory fluctuations in
consumption (Shimer and Werning, 2008).
The optimality of constant benefits discussed above rests on the assumption of homogenous
workers for whom the trade-o↵ between insurance and incentives does not change over time.
In the presence of duration dependence, when the job-finding probabilities deteriorate over the
spell of unemployment, or when there is heterogeneity in the types of unemployed, the trade-o↵
between insurance and incentives changes during the spell and the optimal benefits should also
vary over time (Shimer and Werning, 2006). The exact profile of optimal benefits depends
on the mechanism that drives duration dependence and on the form of heterogeneity. If job
opportunities deteriorate over time because of skills depreciation, then declining benefits are
optimal. This is because with constant benefits the long-term unemployed would have lower
incentives to accept a job o↵er. If instead the unemployed receive fewer job o↵ers over time,
then increasing benefits could be optimal as the reason for remaining in unemployment is not
because of an increasing reservation wage but because of lack of job opportunities. Similarly,
the form of heterogeneity would dictate a di↵erent profile of benefits. A decreasing profile would
be optimal if the pool of unemployed changes over time consisting of types with high value of
leisure. On the other hand, benefits should rise during an unemployment spell if workers face
higher uncertainty and higher variance in the wage draws they receive. This higher value of
search is associated with a higher reservation wage and a longer unemployment duration, which
could lead to a better job match if the unemployed is properly insured over time.
Tests of the Optimality of UI
Gruber (1997) uses the framework suggested by Baily (1978) to estimate the optimal level of UI
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benefits. The optimal level of benefits trades o↵ the gains from consumption smoothing against
the costs of search distortion. The gains are computed by the sensitivity of consumption to the
replacement rate of benefits, while the costs by the elasticity of the duration of unemployment
with respect to balanced-budget increases in UI benefits and taxes. The findings suggest that
even at very high degrees of risk aversion, the optimal replacement rate is below 50 percent,
while the average replacement rate in the data used in the study is 42.6 percent. Gruber (1997)
also shows that the results are very sensitive to the magnitudes of the elasticity of unemployment
duration used and the e↵ect of the replacement rate on consumption smoothing.
Shimer and Werning (2007) develop a dynamic model of job search with risk aversion and
find that a worker’s utility while unemployed is a monotone function of her after-tax reservation
wage, which implies that the objective of an optimal UI system is to choose benefits and taxes so
that the after-tax reservation wage is maximized. Contrary to the consumption based optimal
test proposed by Gruber (1997), the approach suggested by Shimer and Werning (2007) does
not require an estimate of risk aversion or information on consumption. Instead their test
uses information on how unemployment benefits a↵ect the pre-tax reservation wage and on the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits. The drawback of this approach is
that while there are many empirical studies on the elasticity of unemployment duration there
is scarce evidence on the sensitivity of the reservation wage to unemployment benefits.
Chetty (2008) also provides a test for the optimal UI taking into account the two possible
e↵ects of unemployment benefits: the moral hazard e↵ect and the liquidity e↵ect. He finds that
the liquidity e↵ect accounts for 60 percent of the marginal e↵ect of UI benefits on durations
in the United States. This estimate implies that a replacement rate of 50 percent is near
optimal that pays constant benefits for 6 months. To evaluate the optimality of UI the test
requires estimates of three su cient statistics: the duration of benefit receipt, the elasticity of
UI-compensated duration with respect to UI benefit level, and the moral hazard and liquidity
e↵ect of benefits. Contrary to the studies by Gruber (1997) and Shimer and Werning (2007), the
optimal level of benefit does not necessarily fall with the elasticity of UI-compensated duration
with respect to UI benefit level. The result depends on whether an increase of benefits leads
to longer duration due to a liquidity e↵ect (which smooths consumption) or due to a moral
hazard e↵ect (which subsidizes leisure). In other words, a higher liquidity e↵ect would imply
that increases in benefit generosity would be welfare improving.
These three di↵erent ways to test for the optimality of unemployment insurance highlight
the importance of obtaining precise estimates of key parameters such as the elasticity of un-
employment duration with respect to unemployment benefits, the sensitivity of the reservation
wage and consumption to benefit changes.
Optimal UI over the Business Cycle
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There are few recent studies on the optimal UI over the business cycle. Andersen and Svarer
(2010) and Landais et al. (2010) find countercyclical optimal benefits. In Andersen and Svarer
(2010) the government uses UI to smooth consumption over the business cycle facing an in-
tertemporal budget constraint. Landais et al. (2010), instead, impose a balanced budget in
each period so UI cannot be used for consumption smoothing. In their paper, there is a dis-
tinction between two sources of unemployment, stemming from matching frictions (in booms)
and job rationing (in recessions). In recessions, the moral hazard problem is smaller than in
booms because of the limited number of jobs available, while the value of consumption smooth-
ing remains constant over the cycle. Due to job rationing the individual e↵ort to find a job
creates a negative externality to other job seekers. In this setting, the optimal UI rule implies
more generous benefits in recessions than in expansions, which correct the negative externality
by reducing job search e↵ort. Mitman and Rabinovich (2011) also study the optimal provision
of UI over the business cycle using a general equilibrium search model in which they allow for
aggregate productivity shocks. They also consider the optimal design of both the level and
duration of benefits. They find that the optimal path of benefits is pro-cyclical. The main
di↵erence with the previous studies is that they allow for wage bargaining, which implies that
UI benefit changes do a↵ect wages, instead of assuming rigid wages.
Other Design Issues
Finally, as we discussed above, workers can a↵ect their work e↵ort and induce quits, which will
a↵ect the unemployment inflow. In order to discourage quits and shirking, the system UI should
induce a large drop in consumption at beginning of the unemployment spell. A waiting period
before benefits are paid out is a way to discourage quits. Another way to discourage quits is by
providing benefits only to unemployed who were laid o↵ and not to those who voluntarily quit
their jobs.
Unemployed workers may look for jobs, and once employed, may quit or induce a layo↵
quickly in order to upgrade their benefits. To prevent such cycles of unemployment spells with
short intermediate employment spells eligibility criteria are important. The optimal policy
should condition the benefits paid to unemployed workers on their employment history, such
that the coverage increases with the length of previous employment spells (Hopenhayn and
Nicolini, 2009). As we will discuss below, in most existing UI systems eligibility criteria include
a minimum employment period preceding the unemployment spell. When these criteria are not
satisfied then the unemployed is either not eligible for benefits or may only receive the benefits
not used in the previous unemployment spell.
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2.2 Empirical evidence
This section reviews the empirical evidence concerning the e↵ect of unemployment insurance on
the behavior of unemployed workers. The empirical evidence on the inflow into unemployment
is rather limited. Therefore, we focus on studies on unemployment outflow and the evidence on
the e↵ect of UI on post-unemployment outcomes, in particular wages and job durations. We
also review studies that challenge the moral hazard e↵ects of UI by emphasizing the e↵ects of
liquidity constraints or advocating that UI benefits should be cyclically dependent.
2.2.1 Unemployment outflow
The empirical literature on how UI a↵ects the exit rate from unemployment is very large.
Reviews of the early literature are given by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Pedersen
and Westergard-Nielsen (1993). The early literature focused mostly on the e↵ect of the level of
benefits using cross-sectional variation at the individual level. Benefit levels are generally found
to have significant e↵ects in U.S. and U.K. studies, while most continental European studies
find insignificant or weak e↵ects. In most US studies the elasticity of unemployment duration
with respect to benefit level is in the range 0.3 to 0.9 (Holmlund, 1998). The disincentive e↵ect
of benefit level on the exit rate from unemployment depends also on the spell duration, with
higher e↵ects for short-term unemployed (Nickell, 1979; Fallick, 1991). The research on the
e↵ect of potential benefit duration (PBD) on the exit rate from unemployment is extensive both
in the US and in Europe. Older studies for the US and Canada include Ham and Rea (1987),
Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990). Early studies for Europe are Hunt (1995), Carling et
al. (1996) and Winter-Ebmer (1998). One common finding of most studies is a sharp increase
in the exit rate close to benefit expiration.9
More recently, a number of U.S. and European studies have exploited policy driven changes
in benefit levels. These studies examine how UI recipients react to incentives using a quasi-
experimental identification of the treatment e↵ect that allows the researchers to adopt a di↵erence-
in-di↵erence approach. The policy change allows for a before-after comparison; the first di↵er-
ence. Then, there is usually a treatment group that is a↵ected and a control group that is not
a↵ected; the second di↵erence. The di↵erence-in-di↵erences gives the treatment e↵ect of the
policy change. Other recent studies use a regression discontinuity methodology exploiting one
or more discontinuities in the relationship between benefit level or benefit duration as for ex-
ample age at inflow or pre-unemployment work experience. The assumption is that individuals
on either side of the discontinuity only di↵er slightly, except for the exposure to a di↵erent UI
benefit level or benefit duration. The di↵erence in behavior of individuals close to either side of
the discontinuity then reveals how the di↵erence in UI a↵ects behavior. An overview of recent
studies on the e↵ects of UI on unemployment outflow is provided in the top part of Table 1.
12
The studies are characterized in terms of country, calendar time period, sample size, treated
population, the identification strategy and the e↵ect of UI on duration using two indicators for
the dose-response e↵ects to enable a comparison between the studies.
Di↵erence-in-Di↵erence Studies
Card and Levine (2000) study an extension of UI benefits in the state of New Jersey in 1996.
For political reasons unrelated to the state of the labor market UI benefits were temporarily –
for a period of 26 weeks – extended with 13 weeks. The authors compare the unemployment
exit rates before, during and after the benefit extension was introduced finding a decrease of
the exit rates by about 15%. From simulations of the long-term e↵ect of the benefit extension
they conclude that the 13 weeks of extra benefits would raise the average duration of regular
UI claims by about 1 week.
Carling et al. (2001) study the e↵ects of a cut in Swedish replacement rates in January 1996
from a maximum of 80% to 75%. Because of a ceiling on the benefit level actual replacement
rates can be lower than the maximum rates while for high earnings workers the UI replacement
rate is not a↵ected at all. The authors compare the job-finding rates of UI recipients younger
than 55 years who were a↵ected by the cut in the replacement rates with the job-finding rates
of workers who were not a↵ected. They distinguish two treatment groups, one with exact 80%
replacement before the change and 75% after the change and one group with a replacement
rate between 75% and 80% before the change and 75% after the change. There is one control
group with individuals for whom the cut in benefits did not apply because their earnings were
always above the threshold. The authors find that the cut in UI benefits substantially increased
the outflow from unemployment with an implied elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to
benefits of about 1.6.
Roed and Zhang (2003) present an analysis of unemployment durations of Norwegian workers
who were below 60 years of age, became unemployed during the 1990s and who were eligible for
unemployment benefits. They exploit two particular features of the Norwegian benefit system.
First, UI benefits depend on the entry month into unemployment because they are calculated on
the basis of earnings during the previous calendar year. Second, benefits are indexed depending
on the entry month. Furthermore, because of the ceiling in earnings the replacement rate
goes down with earnings for workers who earned more than the ceiling. These are sources of
independent variation in replacement rates the authors use to estimate benefit elasticities which
they find to range from 0.95 for men to 0.35 for women. This implies that a 10% reduction in
benefits may cut a 10-month unemployment duration by approximately one month for men and
1-2 weeks for women.
Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) exploit a policy change in Slovenia that involved substantial
reductions in the potential duration of UI benefits for four groups of workers plus no change in
13
benefits for another group, which served as a natural control. The distinction between the four
groups is on the pre-unemployment work experience. Depending on this experience the PBD
could be reduced from 6 to 3, 9 to 6, 12 to 6 or 18 to 9 months. The e↵ect of the reduction in
maximum benefit duration on the unemployment duration depends on the size of the reduction
but also on the age and gender of the worker. Based on the parameter estimates of their hazard
rate models they perform simulation from which it appears that for a 30-old male worker in
good health for whom the PBD was reduced from 12 to 6 months the median unemployment
duration reduced with 1.1 months; for a female worker with the same characteristics the drop
in median unemployment duration was 3.5 months.
Lalive et al. (2006) study a policy change in the structure of the UI benefits in Austria
which a↵ected various unemployed workers di↵erently. A first group experienced an increase
in the replacement rate, a second group experienced an extension of the PBD, a third group
experienced both a higher RR and a longer PBD, and a fourth group experienced no change
in the policy parameters. What happened to an individual depended on the monthly income
of the worker and the work experience and age of the worker. For workers with high previous
work experience PBD increased, respectively, from 30 to 39 weeks for the age group 40-49,
and from 30 to 52 weeks for workers 50 and older. The sample consists of UI recipients in
the age range 35 to 54. The authors estimate hazard rate models and on the basis of their
parameter estimates they present simulation results. An increase in PBD from 30 to 39 weeks
leads to an increase of 0.4 week of unemployment while an increase in PBD from 30 to 52 weeks
increase the unemployment duration with 2.3 weeks. The increase in the RR of 4.6 %-point
leads to an increase in the unemployment duration of 0.4 weeks, implying a benefit elasticity of
approximately 0.4.
Regression Discontinuity Studies
Card et al. (2007b) exploit a discontinuity in the relationship between work experience and UI
entitlement for Austrian workers. Individuals with less than 36 months of employment in the
past five years receive 20 weeks of benefits, while those who have worked for 36 months or more
receive 30 weeks of benefits. Using a sample of workers aged 20-50 the authors find that UI
recipients who are eligible for 30 weeks of benefits exhibit job finding rates during the first 20
weeks who are 5-9% lower than those who are eligible for only 20 weeks of benefits.
Lalive (2008) exploits an age-specific change in the maximum benefit duration in Austria
in June 1988; for workers age 50 or more the PBD was extended from 30 weeks to 209 weeks
in some regions but not in others. He uses this age discontinuity in UI entitlement to establish
the e↵ect of the PBD extension on the unemployment duration. The data refer to workers aged
46 to 53. From the estimates it appears that for men the duration of job search is prolonged
by about 14.8 weeks, while for women this increase is 74.8 weeks. This di↵erence is attributed
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to the age distance to early retirement age. The early retirement age for women is 54 while
for men it is 59. Apparently, for older Austrian women UI provided a quantitatively important
pathway into early retirement.
In January 2003 unemployment benefits in Finland were increased for workers with long
employment histories. The average benefit increase was 15% for the first 150 days of the
unemployment spell. At the same time the severance pay system was abolished.10 Uusitalo
and Verho (2010) using this policy change to analyze the e↵ect of the UI replacement rate on
unemployment duration find that the change in the benefit structure reduced the re-employment
hazards on average by 17%. The e↵ect is largest at the beginning of the unemployment spell
and disappears after the eligibility for the increased benefits expires. Based on their estimates
the authors conclude that the benefit increase extended time until re-employment by 33 days
or 11.9%. Given that the benefit increase was 15% this implies that the elasticity of time until
re-employment with respect to the replacement rate would be about 0.8.
Finally, Schmieder et al. (2012a) implement a regression discontinuity design using German
data of workers in the age range 40 to 49 entering unemployment between July 1987 and
March 1999 when the UI system was stable. In this age range over the particular period of
time there were three sharp age thresholds in the potential benefit duration: age 42 (12 to 18
months), age 44 (18 to 22 months), and age 49 (22 to 26 months). The authors find that for
each additional month of UI durations the unemployment duration increases on average with
0.10-0.13 months.11
Discussion
The main conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of the overview of studies presented in
Table 1 is that there are substantial e↵ects on unemployment duration if the replacement rate or
the potential benefit duration change. The magnitude of the e↵ects di↵ers for di↵erent countries
and di↵erent types of policy changes, but the e↵ects are not so much di↵erent. An extension of
potential benefit duration leads to an increase in actual unemployment duration of about 20%
of the original benefit duration extension. One of the exceptions is for Slovenian women, the
other is for Austrian women. The first may have to do with the attachment to the labor market,
the second with the nearness of early retirement benefits. The benefit elasticity seems to range
between 0.4 and 1, with the Swedish findings of Carling et al. (2006) as an exception. Although
the ages of the workers being investigated di↵ers, age di↵erences between treatment e↵ects seem
rather limited, with the exception of Austrian older women. Incentives clearly matter. The job
finding behavior of unemployed workers is influenced both by the level and the duration of the
UI benefits.
An important dimension in the optimal design of UI is to understand if any of the two
main components of the benefit system – benefit level and benefit duration – matter more by
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a↵ecting di↵erently the behavior of unemployed workers. The existing evidence suggests that
both types of increase in the generosity of the UI system lead to longer unemployment duration.
Consistent with the theory, most of the e↵ect of the increase in benefit levels takes place early
in the unemployment spell, while in the case of the extension of benefit duration most of the
e↵ect arises around the dates when benefits expired. An intuitive way to compare PBD and
RR is by splitting up the total increase in benefit costs into the fraction of direct costs (without
behavioral changes) and the fraction of indirect costs resulting from changes in behavior. For
example, an increase in RR will raise benefit payments even if individuals do not change their
behavior, simply because higher benefits have to be paid for the same number of days individuals
spend in unemployment. Furthermore, the RR increase will induce individuals to stay longer in
unemployment, thus raising benefit payments further. Lalive et al. (2006) who perform such an
exercise find that an increase in PBD induces a substantially higher share of behavioral costs
than an increase in RR. In other words, individuals react strongly to the increase in benefit
duration, and these behavioral changes are the main factor driving the total additional costs of
the policy change. Di↵erences in replacement ratios are here of lesser importance.
The finding that changes in the duration of benefits leads to stronger e↵ects compared to
changes in the level of benefits means that benefit duration is a more e↵ective tool to influ-
ence incentives. One concern is that the quality of post-unemployment jobs is a↵ected too.
The higher exit rate from unemployment might be associated with jobs of lower quality and
with higher probability of re-entering unemployment. We discuss the empirical findings of the
relationship between PBD and the quality of post-unemployment jobs in the next section.
2.2.2 Post-unemployment outcomes
Unlike the evidence for the e↵ect of UI and in particular of benefit duration on the outflow
rate, the evidence on the e↵ect on post-unemployment outcomes is mixed. In older studies
the main conclusion regarding the e↵ect of UI on wages suggests a weak positive e↵ect. There
is, however, variation in the evidence with some studies finding no e↵ect while others finding
positive e↵ects.12
Early 20th century studies include Addison and Blackburn (2000) who find that more gen-
erous UI either in terms of the benefit level or longer entitlement periods hardly increase re-
employment wages. The evidence on the e↵ect of the UI system on employment duration is
rather mixed. Evidence from Canada (Belzil, 2001) and the US (Centeno, 2004) suggests that
jobs accepted close to benefit termination have a higher dissolution rate while higher benefit
levels increase the quality of job match measured by the duration of the employment spell.13
An overview of recent studies on the e↵ects of UI on post-unemployment outcomes using a
dif-in-dif or regression discontinuity approach is provided in the bottom part of Table 1.
The study by Card et al. (2007b), which was discussed before, shows that extended benefits
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do not a↵ect the “match quality” of subsequent jobs as measured by mean wages or the duration
of subsequent jobs. Centeno and Novo (2007) exploit an age-specific change in entitlement
introduced in Portugal in July 1999. For the age group 30 to 34 the maximum benefit duration
was increased from 15 to 18 months, for the age group 35 to 39 it stayed 18 months. The
new law appears to have had a small positive impact on reemployment wages; the 3 months
benefit extension increased the wages with 2.8 percent. The increase was somewhat stronger
at the bottom of the reemployment distribution. Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) use the
policy change in Slovenia which reduced the PBD for many groups of workers substantially
to investigate the quality of post-unemployment jobs. They find that the reduction in the
potential benefit duration did not a↵ect the likelihood of a worker taking a temporary rather
rather than a permanent job, had hardly any e↵ect on job separation rates and did not a↵ect
post-unemployment wages.
Finally, Caliendo et al. (2012) focus on a discontinuity in the German UI system where at
the age of 45 the maximum benefit duration increases by 6 months from 12 to 18 months. They
investigate an inflow sample into unemployment for West-Germany from the years 2001 to 2003.
Men are ranged between 44 and 46 years, women between 43.5 and 46.5 years. The authors find
that the exit rate from unemployment decreases because of the extended benefit period (with
14%). The overall e↵ect of the extended benefit duration on the exit rate from subsequent em-
ployment is negative but small and not significantly di↵erent from zero. However, the treatment
e↵ect is heterogeneous. The same applies to the post-unemployment wages. Unemployed who
obtain jobs close and after the time when benefits are exhausted are significantly more likely
to exit subsequent employment and receive lower wages compared to their counterparts with
extended benefit duration.
Whereas in every study there is evidence of replacement rate or potential benefit duration
to a↵ect the job finding rate, the evidence on post-unemployment outcomes suggests that there
are no e↵ects on average on the quality of the post-unemployment job. However, there is
some evidence that there are heterogeneous e↵ects, which lead to zero net e↵ects when this
heterogeneity is ignored, indicating that at least some individuals might be liquidity constrained.
Given this mixed evidence, it is di cult to provide a clear interpretation of these findings and
their implication for the wage-setting process. The lack of evidence of post-unemployment e↵ects
may indicate that there is no UI-induced wage bargaining, as one would expect to observe an
e↵ect on re-employment wages. However, it may also be the case that wages are an imperfect
indicator of the job characteristics that workers value.
2.2.3 Recent debate
The conventional disincentive or moral hazard e↵ect of UI has been challenged recently in two
directions: liquidity constraint and cyclical dependency of UI benefits.
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Liquidity constraint and moral hazard
Workers remain longer unemployed when they receive more generous benefits. This may be
due to a moral hazard e↵ect. An alternative explanation is that this is due to liquidity con-
straints. Chetty (2008) uses variation in severance pay policies across firms in the U.S. to
identify the e↵ect of liquidity constraints. A severance payment is a lump-sum payment that
does not influence the leisure-work tradeo↵ and therefore should not have an e↵ect on behavior
unless through a liquidity constraint. Chetty’s analysis is based on 2441 individuals of whom
471 (18%) report receiving a severance payment. There is no information about the size of
the severance payments. From his analysis Chetty concludes that 60 percent of the increase
in unemployment durations caused by UI benefits is due to a “liquidity e↵ect” rather than
distortions in marginal incentives to search – the moral hazard e↵ect. Chetty finds two pieces
of evidence. First, increases in benefits have much larger e↵ects on durations for liquidity
constraint households. Second, lump-sum severance payments increase durations substantially
among constrained households.
The change in the Finish UI system exploited by Uusitalo and Verho (2010) to investigate
the e↵ect of RR on unemployment durations was not one to one. The eligibility criteria for the
severance pay in the old system were slightly di↵erent than the eligibility criteria of higher daily
allowance in the new system, and there were small groups of unemployed who lost the right to
the severance pay without becoming eligible for the higher daily allowance (1420 individuals)
or who gained higher allowance though they were not eligible for the severance pay before the
reform (681 individuals). These small groups were used to disentangle the e↵ect of the removal
of severance pay and the e↵ect of the higher RR in the early period of unemployment. The
authors find that the e↵ect of the lost severance pay is insignificantly di↵erent from zero.
Whereas both Chetty (2008) and Uusitalo and Verho (2010) only have a relatively small
number of observations, Card et al. (2007b) have many more observations to estimate the e↵ects
of severance pay (see also Table 1). They compare the search behavior or people who were laid
o↵ just before and just after the 36-month cuto↵ for severance pay eligibility. They find that the
lump sum severance pay has a significant e↵ect on the duration of joblessness. The job finding
rate during the first 20 weeks of unemployment (the eligibility period for regular unemployment
benefits in Austria) is 8-12% lower for those who are just barely eligible for severance pay than
for those who are just barely ineligible. A substantial share of the behavioral response to longer
UI benefits is attributable to a liquidity e↵ect rather than due to moral hazard. All in all, the
importance of liquidity constraints is still not well established.
Cyclical variations in UI benefit generosity
The disincentive e↵ect of UI may be sensitive to the business cycle and lower during recessions
because of higher search costs and weaker labor demand. The occurrence of longer unemploy-
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ment duration during recessions may call for more generous benefits since the trade-o↵ between
consumption smoothing and moral hazard is di↵erent than in a booming labor market with low
unemployment.
There are few countries in which the UI structure depends on the business cycle conditions
and in particular on the regional unemployment rate (Canada, Poland and the U.S.). In the
case of the U.S., there is an extension of up to 20 weeks through the Extended Benefits program
to the regular benefit duration of 26 weeks. This extension is provided to those unemployed who
lost their job in states in which the level and the change in the state unemployment rate exceeds
a certain threshold. Although the thresholds vary across states, the typical lower threshold is
6.5 percent for extensions of 13 weeks and 8.0 percent for extensions of 20 weeks. These are
combined with an increase of 10 percent in the unemployment rate over the previous two years.
This system has been present for decades (Kiley, 2003). As a response to the Great Recession
of 2008/2009 there were four additional extensions of unemployment benefit duration on top of
the automatic extension of 20 weeks. Maximum UI durations in the U.S. were extended to as
long as 99 weeks.14 The U.S. system of cyclical variation in UI benefit generosity is relatively
unusual for other OECD countries.
There is some recent empirical evidence in support of cyclical variations in UI benefit gen-
erosity. Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010) show for the U.S. that the elasticity of unemployment
duration with respect to the UI benefit level varies with the unemployment rate. Theoretically,
the duration elasticity depends on the relative importance of search e↵ort and reservation wage.
Through the reservation wage, there is a positive correlation between the duration elasticity
and the unemployment rate, while through search e↵ort there may be a negative correlation.
Empirically there is a negative correlation between the duration elasticity and the unemploy-
ment rate. This implies that moral hazard is lower when unemployment is high. Schmieder
et al. (2012a) find similar results for Germany. These findings suggest that extensions of UI
duration during recessions can be welfare enhancing.
3 Labor market performance and UI systems
3.1 Labor market performance
Table 2 presents di↵erences in labor market position for prime age – 25 to 54 – and older – 55
to 64 – individuals distinguished by gender. In 2010 unemployment rates for prime age men
ranged from a low 3.0% in Luxembourg to a high 18.1% in Spain. For prime age women the
ranges in unemployment rates are similar, from a low 2.6% in Norway to 19.2% in Spain. For
prime age men the range in employment rates is limited from a low 75.4% in Estonia to a high
92.4% in Switzerland. For prime age women the range of the employment rates is substantially
larger, from 30.1 in Turkey to 82.2% in Norway.
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Unemployment rates are very much the same for older and prime age individuals. The fact
that unemployment rates among older workers are rather low does not necessarily mean that
the UI system has no influence. Usually older employed workers have a low probability to lose
their job so the fact that they have an average unemployment rate may point to unemployment
duration being above average.
Among older men and women employment rates are substantially lower than among prime
age individuals. The employment rate among older males in Hungary is at the low end with
39.6% and in Iceland it is at the high end of the distribution with 83.9%. Among older females
employment rates are even lower with Turkey having the lowest with 17.1% and Iceland being
the highest with 77.0%.
Table 2 also presents cross-country information on the percentages of long-term unemploy-
ment in overall unemployment, that is the share of unemployed with an unemployment duration
of more than 1 year. Whereas the cross-country variation in unemployment rates was rather lim-
ited, the variation in the share of long-term unemployed is substantial. Korea has the shortest
unemployment durations with only 1% of male unemployment and 0% of female unemployment
lasting longer than one year. At the top end of the unemployment durations is the Slovak
Republic with a long-term unemployment share for males of 58% and for females of 61%.
3.2 UI systems
From the overview of empirical studies it is clear that the di↵erences in magnitude of the e↵ects
of replacement rate and benefit duration on unemployment duration are not so big despite
di↵erences in research design and sample. In this section we discuss cross-country di↵erences
in UI systems to illustrate that this similarity in findings is all the more remarkable since the
structure of UI systems di↵er between countries in a number of dimensions although there are
similarities. One of the similarities between the various systems is related to the eligibility
conditions. These conditions include the requirement to be involuntary unemployed, being
registered in the employment o ce and actively seeking for employment.15 Another similarity
is the existence of a qualifying period for eligibility. The requirement is a minimum number of
weeks, months or days of employment during a specified period before entering unemployment.
In few countries there is a separate employment and contributions requirement. As shown in the
first column of Table 3, the exact requirements vary a lot across countries; about 6 months of
employment and contributions in the last one or one-and-a-half year in Austria, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg and Sweden; 1 year in the last 2 years in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Switzerland;
4 months in the last 2.3 years in France; 1 year in the last 3 years in Denmark and Estonia; 1
year in the last 4 years in Hungary; 1 year in the last 6 years in Spain. In the U.S., few states
require a specified number of weeks (15 or 20), while most states require minimum earnings
which equal to a specified multiple of the weekly benefit amount.
20
A waiting period of few days for the eligible unemployed exists in a number of countries: 14
days in Canada and up to 14 days in New Zealand, 7 in Estonia, Finland, France, Italy, Japan,
Korea and U.S.; 6 in Greece; 5 in Sweden and Switzerland and 3 in Ireland, Norway and the
U.K.
In most countries benefits are determined by the previous earnings of the unemployed. The
earnings base is usually the average of a specified period before becoming unemployed (gross
or net), which varies from 1 month (Belgium) to 3 months (Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy,
Korea, Luxembourg), 6 months (Canada, Iceland, Spain) or 1 year (Estonia, France, Hungary,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia). Few countries consider a reference earnings level instead of
the individual earnings as the base for calculating the amount of benefits. This reference level
is the national minimum wage for Greece or the state weekly average earnings in the U.S.
A flat benefit exists in Australia, Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland and the U.K., while
most other countries impose a ceiling on the benefit amount. The payment rate, which is a
percentage of the previous earnings, varies from 50 per cent (Estonia, Korea, Slovak Republic,
Turkey, United States), to 90 per cent in Denmark. Many countries have a declining profile of
the payment rate over the duration of unemployment. Such declining benefits are present in
Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.
The maximum benefit duration is either fixed or depends on the insurance period and/or
age. Only few countries set a fixed maximum benefit period, which is 24 months in Denmark
(since 2012 while it used to be 48 months before), 500 days in Finland, 6 months in Slovak
Republic, and 26 weeks in the U.K. and the U.S. In mostly all other countries the maximum
benefit duration varies both within and between countries. The within variation depends on
the contribution history and in some countries also on age (Austria, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland). The age dimension in most of these
countries is related to older workers, for which the duration of benefits is usually longer. Only
Germany and Portugal have a structure of benefit duration which depends on both the history of
contributions and age for also younger workers. The variation of the minimum benefit duration
between countries ranges from a around 3 months in Canada, Japan, Korea, Slovenia and
Turkey, around 6 months in Estonia, Greece, Germany, Italy, Poland, 1 year in Norway and
Sweden and 2 years in Portugal. The maximum benefit duration varies from 5 months in Czech
Republic, 8 months in Korea, 9 months in Hungary, 10 months in Canada, 1 year in Austria,
Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Turkey, 2 years in Germany, Norway, Spain and 72
months in Portugal. In Australia, Belgium and New Zealand there is an unlimited duration,
while in three countries (Canada, Poland and the U.S.) the duration of benefits depends also
on the regional (state) unemployment rate.
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4 Policy issues concerning the design of UI systems
In this section we draw conclusions about relevant policy issues related to the design of the UI
system. We confront the main lessons from the literature overview on UI related incentives with
the characteristics of the UI systems across countries.
4.1 Benefit structure
In most countries the maximum benefit duration is age-dependent, either directly (especially in
Europe) or through entitlement criteria that relate the maximum duration of benefits to previous
work experience. The rationale behind age-dependent unemployment insurance is twofold. The
first is related to the labor market position of older workers who once unemployed might face
worse employment prospects. The second is related to the fact that young and older workers
are characterized by di↵erent expected horizons in the labor market.
To the extent that the labor market position of older workers is weak the insurance compo-
nent in the trade-o↵ between providing insurance and reducing moral hazard is larger. However,
unconditional extension of benefits to older workers might reduce their re-employment incen-
tives. Recent evidence suggests that, in countries in which UI can be used as a pathway to early
retirement, unemployment for older workers is an absorbing state (Tatsiramos, 2010).
The proximity to retirement might also modify the trade-o↵ between insurance and incen-
tives. For instance, a declining profile of benefits that we observe in a number of countries
might not be e↵ective in introducing incentives to exit from unemployment when there is short
distance to retirement. As discussed in Section 2.1.4, the theory of optimal UI suggests that
employment taxes can be combined with a declining profile of benefits in order to create incen-
tives for exiting unemployment. For older workers incentives to search and find a job may be
increased by providing employment subsidies. However, if the time horizon is too short this will
not work either. Shortly before retirement – up to a couple of years – older unemployed workers
may stop searching for a job altogether irrespective of the structure of benefits and taxes or
subsidies on employment. Combining the UI system and pension system may revitalize search
of older unemployed workers, for example by taxing pensions in proportion to the length of the
unemployment spells (Hairault et al., 2010). Providing age-dependent benefits in the form of
longer benefit durations for older workers in combination with a tax on pensions will provide
more insurance and at the same time introduce incentives to search for employment.
4.2 Eligibility conditions
Eligibility conditions include general conditions of being available for work and actively searching
for a job, the qualifying period that is required to be employed in order to be eligible for benefits,
the waiting period that is required before the benefits are available for the unemployed and the
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condition to be laid o↵. These conditions are in general in line in all countries with the optimal
design of a UI system (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 2009), which we discussed in Section 2.1.4.
Linking eligibility to benefits with the employment history is certainly an e↵ective mechanism
to prevent unemployment cycles with short intermediate employment spells.
The eligibility conditions may be also used to enhance the incentives to search for employ-
ment throughout the unemployment spell and reduce the tendency of some unemployed to search
more intensively only closer to when benefits are about to expire. Given that jobs found closer
to benefit exhaustion can be of lower quality (e.g. Belzil 2001; Centeno 2004; Caliendo et al.
2012) creating incentives to find jobs faster can have important welfare e↵ects. One possible way
to achieve this is to link directly the qualifying period with the duration of the unemployment
spell by considering a qualifying period which is increasing with the unemployment duration.
Contrary to the eligibility condition of a qualifying period (minimum employment period) that
a↵ects the incentives during employment, linking the qualifying period with the length of the
unemployment duration could introduce additional incentives during the unemployment spell.
These additional incentives might reduce the spike in the exit rate from unemployment closer to
when benefits are about to expire by defining another focal point earlier in the unemployment
spell, i.e. the unemployment duration with the minimum employment duration required to
become eligible for unemployment benefits in a future unemployment spell.
4.3 Business Cycle
There are two ways business cycles a↵ect unemployment. The first, which is a direct one, is
related to an increase in layo↵s and reduction of hirings by firms in the case of a recession. The
second, which is indirect, is related to a change in the composition of unemployed workers. For
instance, during a recession more older workers and higher educated ones enter the unemploy-
ment pool. To the extent that the direct e↵ect of the recession on the unemployment rate and
the compositional change are large, there is scope for labor market policies to adjust.16
The occurrence of longer unemployment duration during recessions may call for more gen-
erous benefits since the trade-o↵ between consumption smoothing and moral hazard may be
di↵erent than in a booming labor market with low unemployment. In particular, with a weaker
labor demand during a recession, unemployed workers may face di culties to find a new job,
which increases the consumption smoothing purpose of UI. On the other hand, cyclical ad-
justment of maximum benefit duration might also a↵ect incentives for UI recipients reinforcing
moral hazard problems. These disincentives may be more pronounced for low income workers
because the gains from working decline with benefits generosity. However, these workers might
be more liquidity constrained (Browning and Crossley, 2001) and benefit more from more gen-
erous UI through consumption smoothing. The evidence presented in Section 2.2.3 shows that
the disincentive e↵ect of benefit extensions in the recent recession has contributed to a small
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extent to the the increase of unemployment and that extensions of UI duration during recessions
can be welfare enhancing.
5 Concluding remarks
UI provides unemployed workers with benefits in order to smooth consumption. UI also creates
disincentives for employed workers to retain their jobs and unemployed workers to find new
jobs. The design of UI needs to consider the trade-o↵ between insurance and incentives. Benefit
structure and eligibility conditions are the most important elements for the design of UI. The
benefit structure determines the replacement rate and the duration of benefit receipt, which
shape the incentives to search for a job and, therefore, the unemployment outflow. The eligibility
conditions, which a↵ect the unemployment inflow, specify the requirements in order to be eligible
for UI. These include general conditions of being available for work and actively searching for
a job, the qualifying period that is required to be employed in order to be eligible for benefits,
the waiting period that is required before the benefits are available for the unemployed and the
condition to be laid o↵.
There is a lot of cross-country and within-country variation in the structure of UI systems.
The cross-country di↵erences are hard to exploit in empirical studies because there are many
other di↵erences between countries that influence labor market behavior. The within-country
variation in UI because of discontinuities in rules or because of calender time changes in the UI
structure allow researchers to establish the e↵ects of replacement rates and maximum benefit
durations on labor market outcomes. In the overview of empirical studies we find that the
di↵erences in magnitude of the e↵ects of replacement rate and benefit duration are not so
big despite di↵erences in research design, sample and UI structure. Apparently, the behavior
of unemployed workers is a↵ected by the two main characteristics of UI systems in a similar
way despite the obvious di↵erences between these systems and other di↵erences in labor market
institutions such as employment protection legislation, minimum wages and active labor market
policies.
We identify four main issues for future research on UI design: personal versus public provi-
sion, the importance of liquidity constraints, behavioral biases, and the optimality of adjustment
of the UI system over the business cycle. In all these issues the common element is the extent
to which moral hazard a↵ects individual behavior and how this changes over the economic
conditions and over time.
In the discussion on public versus private provision of UI there is sometimes a reference to
mandatory UI savings accounts. Individual savings accounts can combine consumption smooth-
ing in the case of job loss without introducing moral hazard e↵ects. This is an interesting
combination but as yet there is little experience with its practical operation or possible e↵ects
24
in a transition period.17
The importance of liquidity constraints is still an open issue. Yet, from a policy point
of view it is very important whether the positive correlation between generosity of benefits
and unemployment duration have to do with adverse e↵ects on search behavior or with lifting
liquidity constraints so that unemployed workers can find better jobs. To disentangle these
two sources of prolonged unemployment duration requires a better understanding of the way
unemployed search and how this changes over time. This understanding will also shed light on
the existence of spikes in the job finding rates, which are associated with worse job matches.
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate to what extent behavioral biases a↵ect job
search and thus the way UI influences search behavior. UI recipients may be “impatient”, i.e.
they assign a lower value to future benefits of job search and therefore exert less e↵ort to find
a job. In addition to this, welfare recipients may have so-called hyperbolic time preferences,
i.e. they are “present biased” in the sense that in the short run they discount highly while
in the long run they discount less. Paserman (2008) introduces hyperbolic discounting in job
search decisions. Della Vigna and Paserman (2005) investigate the relevance of impatience
and hyperbolic discounting in job search decisions. They find that the e↵ect of impatience
on search e↵ort is negative and sizable while the e↵ect of impatience on reservation wages
and re-employment wages is essentially zero. Clearly, the way individuals discount the future,
understand the rules of the game and are influenced by the behavior of others are likely to
explain the observed behavior and provide insights for policy changes that will increase welfare
without reducing e ciency. Alternatively, di↵erent type of data may be used to investigate
the e↵ects of UI on behavior. Krueger and Mueller (2010) for example exploit time-use data to
investigate behavioral response to UI finding evidence of liquidity-constraints to have an impact
on job seekers.
Finally, according to the OECD (2011) the Great Recession served as a tough “stress test”
to the social safety-nets in OECD countries. Many OECD countries took crisis-related measures
to reinforce the insurance part mainly by expanding benefit coverage to previously ineligible
groups of workers. The OECD (2011) concludes that overall benefit generosity has hardly
increased so the expanding of the coverage was not at the expense of a reduction in incentives
to find a job. Whether a UI system is generous not only depends on the level and maximum
duration of the UI benefits but also on the duration of unemployment. If the actual duration
of unemployment is short it is not very important if the maximum benefit duration is short
too. If the maximum benefit duration is long but the actual unemployment duration is even
longer benefits are not very generous. A further complication is that both durations are not
independent. A long maximum duration may cause a long actual duration of unemployment.
Recent theoretical studies show that the optimal UI depends on the state of the labor market
such that in recessions more generous benefits may be provided. In addition, to the extent to
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which individual heterogeneity and duration dependence varies over the business cycle, UI that
varies with business-cycle dependent UI might be relevant. During a recession more generous
benefits can be provided since the trade-o↵ between consumption smoothing and moral hazard
is di↵erent than in a labor market with high unemployment. Whether the cyclical sensitivity of
optimal UI implies that a UI system should have automatic adjustments in terms of generosity
is another matter. This also depends on the costs of such automatic adjustments in terms of
behavioral responses. If unemployed workers anticipate a recession they may try to postpone
becoming unemployed until the economy is in a recession. Once in a recession the lower search
e↵ort might prolong the recession. In other words, the magnitude and duration of a recession
may not be exogenous to labor market behavior of unemployed workers.
A major characteristic of UI systems is that they are constantly changing. Apparently it
is di cult to implement the optimal design. To some extent these changes have to do with
changes in the economy and changing political preferences. They are also a matter of trial and
error, which results from limited understanding of the individual behavioral responses to the
introduction of new policies. The e↵ectiveness of new features of a system and new policies
depends on the way individuals react to these changes. It is only after evaluating these policies
that we can learn about their e↵ectiveness, although in many cases it is still not clear why
some policies work and some other do not. Optimal UI design can only be implemented if the
behavior of unemployed and employer workers is better understood.
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Notes
1Previous overview studies are at least a decade old; see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991),
Holmlund (1998), Karni (1999) and Krueger and Meyer (2002). To some extent Fredriksson
and Holmlund (2006a and 2006b) also provide an overview but their study is much more limited
in scope when it comes to UI benefits and much wider since they also discuss benefit sanctions
and workfare policies.
2See Arpaia and Mourre (2012) for a recent discussion on labor market institutions and
performance of European labor markets.
3Dolls et al. (2012) find that in the presence of an unemployment shock the benefit system
absorbs 48 percent of the shock in the EU, compared to 34 percent in the U.S.
4Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2012) provide an overview over studies on the e↵ectiveness
of benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses. Kluve (2010) presents a meta-analysis of 137
ALMP evaluation studies in Europe finding that simple non-expensive programs with clear
incentives for unemployed workers work best. Card et al. (2010) also present a meta-analysis of
ALMP evaluations with similar findings but emphasizing that longer-term evaluations generally
tend to be more favorable than short-term evaluations.
5See the Appendix for a short technical presentation on unemployment benefits in a job
search model and an equilibrium search model. Rogerson et al. (2005) provide a comprehensive
review of search models.
6We return to this issue when we discuss the optimal design of UI in section 2.1.4 and when
we discuss the recent empirical evidence in section 2.2
7See Rogerson and Shimer (2011) for a review of equilibrium search models with an emphasis
on business cycle fluctuations.
8Of course, if there is a direct relationship between shirking and dismissal the dismissed
worker will not be entitled to UI benefits, but in practice it may be di cult to establish such
a direct relationship. A mechanism to reduce the incentive for workers to quit their job in the
presence of unemployment benefits is the imposition of a tax upon entering unemployment. This
tax is typically in the form of a waiting period during which workers do not receive benefits.
Additionally, the eligibility criteria for receiving benefits may be used to control the inflow into
unemployment. Specifying a minimum employment period to contribute to the unemployment
insurance fund is a way to avoid repeated cycles of short employment followed by receipt of
unemployment benefits.
9Card et al. (2007a) find that close to benefit expiration the unemployment exit rate increases
much more than the re-employment hazard rate does. From this they conclude that the spike
in unemployment-exit rates is to a large extent due to measurement error when using data on
UI benefits only. However, Katz and Meyer (1990) show that for UI recipients in the week of
benefit expiration the job finding rate is about 80% higher than before, while such spikes are not
present for UI non-recipients. Furthermore, using administrative data, Roed and Zhang (2003)
for Norway, Lalive et al. (2006) for Austria, Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) for Slovenia and
Caliendo et al. (2012) for Germany also find evidence for the presence of end-of-benefit spikes.
Clearly, the end-of-benefit spike cannot simply be discarded as a statistical artifact. Boone and
Van Ours (2012) suggest that end-of-benefit spikes in job finding rates are related to optimizing
behavior of unemployed workers who rationally assume that employers will accept delays in the
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starting date of a new job, especially if these jobs are permanent. This gives some workers an
incentive to not immediately start working after they have found a job. Instead they wait until
their benefits expire.
10The increase in benefits was calculated so that in absence of behavioral e↵ects the expected
direct cost for the UI funds would be unchanged.
11In Schmieder et al. (2012b), the authors replicate their results using only the threshold at
age 42, finding a marginal e↵ect of 0.20, which goes down to 0.15 if nonemployment over 5 years
– after the start of the initial spell – is taken into account.
12See Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976; Burgess and Kingston, 1976; Hoelen, 1977; Blau and
Robins, 1986. Classen (1977) finds no relationship between the level of UI benefits and re-
employment wages.
13Tatsiramos (2009) uses ECHP data to investigate the e↵ect of UI on unemployment dura-
tion and subsequent employment stability for eight European countries. He finds that benefit
recipients experience longer unemployment spells but UI also has a positive e↵ect on subsequent
employment stability. The e↵ect of UI on employment stability is more pronounced in countries
with relatively more generous UI systems such as Denmark, Germany, France and Spain when
compared to countries such as Greece and Italy in which the UI system is underdeveloped.
14Rothstein (2011) concludes on the basis of an analysis of data from the Current Population
Survey that the e↵ects on unemployment exits of the benefit extensions has been rather limited.
He attributes 0.1 to 0.5 percentage point of the unemployment rate to the long maximum benefit
durations.
15In some countries voluntarily unemployed or those who are laid o↵ for cause are eligible to
UI although there is typically a waiting period of several weeks.
16Most of the existing empirical evidence, however, suggests that the compositional changes
are rather limited. See for example Imbens and Lynch (2006), Abbring, Van den Berg and Van
Ours (2001), Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2001) who find a small compositional e↵ect.
Mueller (2011), however, documents that in recessions the pool of unemployed shifts towards
workers with high wages in their previous job.
17In a couple of Latin-American countries UI savings accounts have been introduced. A rare
example of an empirical study investigating the labor market e↵ects of these accounts is Reyes
et al. (2011).
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Appendix: Unemployment benefits in Job Search and Equilib-
rium Search Models
Partial Equilibrium Model
The basic search model is central to examine the e↵ect of unemployment benefits on the exit rate
from unemployment. We start by considering the partial equilibrium model under the assumptions that
all unemployed workers receive the same amount of unemployment benefits which are paid for the entire
duration of unemployment. Workers have their (dynamic) reservation wage as the only instrument of
search to influence their unemployment duration. In a stationary environment, the flow value of having
a job is equal to:
⇢Ve = w +  (Vu   Ve), (1)
where ⇢ is the discount rate, Ve is the asset value of having a job, w is the wage rate which is constant
over the duration of employment,   is the exogenous job separation rate and Vu is the asset value of
being unemployed. The employment value function is equal to the current utility w plus the future value
of becoming unemployed, which is actually a loss since (Vu   Ve) is negative.
Similarly, the flow value of being unemployed is equal to:
⇢Vu = b+ µ
Z 1
wr
[Ve   Vu]dH(w), (2)
where b represents the benefit level, µ denotes the exogenous arrival of job o↵ers and H(w) is the wage
o↵er distribution.18 Again, the value function is equal to the current utility, which is the unemployment
compensation b, plus the future value of finding a job, which occurs at rate µ.
Unemployed workers can influence the exit rate from unemployment to work by choosing the reser-
vation wage, i.e. the minimum wage that they require for accepting a job o↵er. From equation (1) the
gain from being employed can be written as:
Ve   Vu = w   ⇢V u
⇢+  
, (3)
which implies that a job-seeker accepts a job o↵er if Ve(w) > Vu or if w > ⇢Vu. In a stationary
environment,  , µ and w are constant. In such an environment, the reservation wage wr is equal to the
flow value of being unemployed: wr = ⇢VU . Substituting (3) and wr = ⇢Vu in (2), the reservation wage
is implicitly defined by:
wr = b+
µ
⇢+  
Z 1
wr
[w   wr]dH(w). (4)
From equation 4 we can derive the following comparative statics. First, @w
r
@b > 0: w
r increases with
unemployment benefits. Second, @w
r
@µ > 0: w
r increases with the rate of incoming job o↵ers  . Third,
@wr
@⇢ < 0: w
r decreases with individual’s increasing focus on the present. Fourth, @w
r
@  < 0: w
r decreases
with increasing separation rate
In a stationary labor market, the job finding rate – or hazard rate – is defined as ✓ = µ[1 H(wr)],
which is the product of the rate by which unemployed workers receive job o↵ers and the probability
that a given o↵er is acceptable. Variables that lead to an increase in the reservation wage lower the
unemployment exit rate ✓ and increase the average duration of unemployment D = 1µ[1 H(x)] =
1
✓ .
From this we can derive the following comparative statics for the duration of unemployment D. First,
@D
@b > 0: D increases with UI benefits; this is the standard disincentive e↵ect of unemployment benefits
on the exit rate of unemployment. Second, @D@⇢ < 0: D decreases with individual’s increasing focus on
the present. Third, @D@  < 0: D decreases with individual’s instability of employment contracts. Fourth,
@D
@µ : the e↵ect is ambiguous since on the one hand µ increases w
r (with negative e↵ect on the exit rate)
and increases D while on the other hand, µ increases directly the exit rate, thus reducing reduces D.19
Allowing for search e↵ort as an additional choice for the unemployed job-seeker does not alter the
main e↵ect of benefit receipt. An increase in benefit level b not only increases the reservation wage wr
but also leads to lower search e↵ort, which further reduces the exit rate. Denoting the intensity of job
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search by the scalar s the job o↵er arrival rate is µ = ↵µ(s) with µ0 > 0 and µ00 < 0. The cost of search
as a function of search e↵ort is denoted by c(s) (c0 > 0, c00 > 0), which means that the instantaneous
utility of an unemployed becomes b   c(s). Furthermore, ↵ is an indicator of the state of the labor
market, which also a↵ect the arrival rate of job o↵ers. Unemployed workers can influence the exit rate
from unemployment to work by choosing not only the reservation wage but also how much e↵ort to exert
in searching for a job. Using equation (4) and the optimal value of search e↵ort satisfies the condition
@wr/@s = 0:
c0(s) =
↵µ0(s)
⇢+  
Z 1
wr
[w   wr]dH(w) (5)
This shows the the optimal search e↵ort is the one that equates the marginal cost of e↵ort with the
marginal benefit.
Non-Stationary Search Model
We now consider the non-stationary case in which the benefit level di↵ers over the unemployment spell
and benefit duration is limited (see Mortensen (1977) and Van den Berg (1990)). When the UI system
defines a declining profile of benefit payments or a termination, the main theoretical prediction is an
increasing job finding rate over the spell of insured unemployment. When the instantaneous income
while unemployed declines over time we get that b(t0)  b(t) for all t0   t, which results in a reduction of
the value of unemployment with Vu(t0)  Vu(t). The decline in the value of unemployment over time and
close to benefit exhaustion leads to a drop in the reservation wage with wr(t0)  wr(t), or alternatively
a higher search intensity s(t0)   s(t), both of which results into a higher exit rate.
Entitlement e↵ects
In most UI systems, benefit entitlement depends on previous employment experience, which is in
contrast with the assumption of the basic model that all unemployed receive benefits. Typically, new
entrants in the labor market and long-term unemployed are not entitled to receive unemployment in-
surance. Finding a job for this type of unemployed means also becoming entitled to unemployment
insurance in case they lose their job in the future. The behavioral e↵ect of this case has similarities with
the non-stationary case we described above, where the unemployed close to benefit exhaustion experience
a lower value of unemployment compared to those at the beginning of unemployment. In general, we
can consider two di↵erent types of job-seekers. The first group consists of those who are entitled or are
at the beginning of their unemployment spell who receive benefits b with value of unemployment Vu.
The second group consists of those who are close to benefit expiration or are not entitled for benefits
with instantaneous income denoted by bn < b and value of unemployment Vun. The flow value of being
employed for a non-entitled unemployed is equal to:
⇢Ve = w +  (Vu   Ve), (6)
which suggests that non-entitled unemployed become entitled for the full unemployment compensation
once they find a job and become unemployed again in the future with probability  . Similarly, the flow
value of being unemployed for a non-entitled unemployed is equal to:
⇢Vun = bn + µ
Z 1
wrn
[Ve(w)  Vun]dH(w), (7)
where bn represents the flow of income di↵erent from unemployment benefits with bn < b. For the
entitled workers their reservation wage satisfies wr = ⇢V u. The reservation wage of the second group
wrn satisfies the equality Ve(wrn) = Vun. Using these relations and equation (6) we can express the value
of unemployment for the non-entitled workers as a function of the two reservation wages in the following
way:
⇢Vun =
⇢wrn +  wr
⇢+  
. (8)
Using equations (6), (7) and (8) we can express the reservation wage of the non-entitled unemployed as
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a function of the entitled ones:
⇢wrn = (⇢+  )bn    wr + µ
Z 1
wrn
[w   wrn]dH(w). (9)
This characterization shows that there is a negative relationship between the two reservation wages. An
increase in the benefit level b of the entitled workers that leads to an increase in their reservation wage
wr is associated with a decline in the reservation wage of the non-entitled ones. This occurs because the
immediate gain from the increase in the benefit level for the non-entitled is zero or very small for those
close to benefit exhaustion, while the value of becoming qualified for benefits in the future increases. This
entitlement e↵ect increases the incentive to accept jobs for UI recipients close to benefits exhaustion and
for those who are not entitled for unemployment benefits.
Changes in PBD and benefit levels
The change in the behavior of job seekers over the spell of unemployment and the entitlement e↵ect
implies that individuals with di↵erent lengths of benefit entitlement would behave di↵erently. For a given
length of unemployment and for a given level of benefits, an increase in the potential benefit duration
will lead to an increase of the reservation wage, and consequently to a rise in the average duration of
unemployment. An increase in the potential benefit duration entails only a small immediate disincentive
e↵ect, that is, at the beginning of the unemployment spell. The largest e↵ect of an increase in benefit
duration is expected for unemployment durations close to the benefit expiration period before the change
of the system. This is because the reservation wage at that time will be significantly higher under the
new system with longer benefit duration compared to the system without a benefit extension, in which
the reservation wage is at its lowest level.
An increase in the benefit level will also a↵ect unemployed workers di↵erently depending on their
elapsed unemployment duration. Contrary to an extension of the benefit duration, an increase in the
replacement rate has its largest e↵ect at the start of the unemployment spell. For a recent unemployed
worker, an increase in the benefit level will lower the exit rate from unemployment as a result of a higher
value of unemployment. The job seeker will demand a higher wage before accepting a job o↵er. For an
unemployed close to benefit exhaustion, a higher benefit level will lead to a higher exit rate due to the
entitlement e↵ect.
Theoretically, the overall e↵ect of an increase in the generosity of benefits on the average duration of
unemployment depends on the balance of two opposing e↵ects. First, a higher amount of benefits and a
longer benefit duration will lower the exit rate from unemployment. Second, for the non-eligible and for
those close to benefit exhaustion, more generous benefits will create an incentive to find a job faster due
to the entitlement e↵ect. However, since the entitlement e↵ect is second-order it is likely the disincentive
e↵ect that dominates so an increase in benefit generosity will lead to longer unemployment durations.
Equilibrium Search Model
In contrast to the search model, in the matching model frictions are modeled in a reduced form using a
matching function M =M(U, V ), where M is the flow of hirings, U denotes the number of unemployed
and V the number of vacancies. The probability of filling a vacancy is m(✓) = M(U, V )/V , which is a
decreasing function of labor market tightness ✓ = V/U . The probability for a job-seeker to find a job is
✓m(✓) = M(U, V )/U , which is an increasing function of labor market tightness. Firms post vacancies,
which are filled at the rate m(✓). The expected profit from a filled job is:
r⇧e = y   w +  (⇧v  ⇧e), (10)
where y is the output, w is the cost of labor and   the exogenous separation rate. The expected profit
from a vacant job is:
r⇧v =  +m(✓)(⇧e  ⇧v), (11)
where  is the cost of posting a vacancy. With the assumption of free entry, ⇧v = 0 and in equilibrium
the average cost of a vacant job must be equal to the expected profit from a filled job. Solving 10 and
11 for ⇧e we get:

m(✓)
=
y   w
⇢+  
, (12)
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which implies a negative relationship between labor market tightness and the wage. The behavior of
workers is very similar to the basic search model with the value of unemployment be defined as:
⇢Vu = b+ ✓m(✓)(Ve   Vu). (13)
Wages are endogenously determined through wage bargaining, which is the mechanism that shares the
rents created due to frictions between workers and firms. For both firms and workers the rents are the
di↵erence between what they could obtain through forming a match and the best outside opportunity.
The sum of the rents creates the surplus to be shared, which is S = Ve   Vu +⇧e  ⇧v. If   represents
the bargaining power of the worker (and 1-  is the bargaining power of the employer), the resulting
negotiated wage is:
w = ⇢Vu +  (y   ⇢Vu), (14)
which can be written as:
w = b+  (✓)(y   b), (15)
with  (✓) =  [⇢+ +✓m(✓)]⇢+ + ✓m(✓) representing the overall bargaining weight of the workers, which does not only
depend on the “direct” bargaining weight   but is also increasing with labor market tightness ✓, and
dependent on discount rate ⇢ and job separation rate  .
The increase of unemployment benefits b increases the value of unemployment for the job-seeker,
which leads to an increase in the wage in the bargaining process. Since a higher wage lowers firms’
expected profits (right hand side of equation 12), to restore equilibrium firms lower the average cost of
vacancies by reducing the number of vacancies, which lowers ✓. To deduce the e↵ect of an increase in
unemployment benefits on unemployment, we consider the equilibrium in steady state in which the flows
into unemployment equal the flows out of unemployment:
 U =  L  ✓m(✓)U = 0, (16)
where   U denotes the change in the number of unemployed and L denotes the number of employed.
The stationary value of unemployment is then given by:
u =
 
  + ✓m(✓)
, (17)
which generates a relationship between unemployment and vacancies, the Beveridge curve. It also shows
that an increase in benefits and the corresponding drop in labor market tightness ✓ leads to an increase
in the unemployment rate.
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Table 2: Unemployment rates and employment rates prime age (25-54) and older individuals
(55-64); long term unemployment; 2010
Men Women Long term
Unemployment Employment Unemployment Employment Unemployment
rate (%) rate (%) rate (%) rate (%) (%)
25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 25-54 55-64 Men Women
Australia 3.7 3.7 87.2 68.6 4.4 2.6 71.9 52.8 20 16
Austria 4.2 2.5 88.7 51.6 3.8 1.6 79.7 39.7 28 22
Belgium 7.2 4.2 85.5 45.6 7.5 5.2 74.4 29.2 50 48
Canada 7.3 7.5 83.9 63.3 6.4 5.6 77.0 53.5 13 11
Czech Republic 5.2 6.5 90.5 58.4 8.0 6.5 73.4 35.5 43 43
Denmark 7.1 6.8 85.9 62.7 5.9 4.6 80.6 52.5 21 17
Estonia 17.6 19.0 75.4 52.2 12.9 14.1 73.9 54.9 48 41
Finland 7.4 7.3 83.9 55.6 6.3 5.8 79.1 56.9 27 19
France 7.1 6.9 87.1 42.1 8.5 6.4 76.7 37.5 42 39
Germany 7.1 8.1 86.5 65.0 6.2 7.3 76.3 50.5 48 46
Greece 9.4 6.2 85.3 56.5 15.5 6.5 61.1 28.9 39 50
Hungary 10.6 8.2 77.9 39.6 10.1 7.3 67.1 30.1 51 50
Iceland 7.0 5.1 86.9 83.9 5.6 3.5 80.6 77.0 23 19
Ireland 15.9 10.5 75.6 58.4 8.5 5.0 66.0 43.0 54 38
Italy 6.6 3.9 83.5 47.7 8.9 3.0 58.7 26.2 47 50
Japan 4.9 6.1 91.4 78.8 4.8 3.3 68.2 52.1 45 25
Korea 3.8 3.4 86.8 75.1 2.9 2.2 60.3 47.1 1 0
Luxembourg 3.0 2.4 92.0 47.7 5.0 2.2 72.6 31.3 32 26
Netherlands 3.6 4.1 90.0 64.8 3.6 3.7 79.3 43.3 28 27
New Zealand 4.4 3.8 87.8 79.6 5.4 2.9 72.8 67.2 9 9
Norway 3.5 1.8 87.1 72.2 2.6 0.9 82.2 65.0 11 8
Poland 7.9 7.5 82.6 45.2 8.7 6.5 71.7 24.2 25 26
Portugal 9.3 10.0 83.9 55.6 12.2 7.6 74.6 43.5 52 53
Slovak Republic 12.4 9.6 81.4 54.1 13.3 11.0 70.1 28.8 58 61
Slovenia 7.1 4.2 85.2 45.5 6.8 3.6 82.1 24.5 45 41
Spain 18.1 14.3 75.7 54.7 19.2 13.8 63.2 33.2 45 41
Sweden 6.0 6.2 88.0 74.3 6.3 4.4 82.0 66.8 18 15
Switzerland 3.4 3.7 92.4 77.9 4.7 3.5 79.4 58.8 28 40
Turkey 10.1 7.5 89.5 46.1 11.4 1.5 30.1 17.1 25 37
United Kingdom 6.7 6.3 85.3 64.9 5.4 3.0 74.4 48.9 37 26
United States 9.3 8.0 81.0 64.4 7.8 6.2 69.3 56.4 30 28
Employment rate = employment as a share of the population;
Unemployment rate = unemployment as a share of the labor force (= employment + unemployment);
Long-term unemployment as percentage of total unemployment.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2011
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